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Abstract
In this note, in an independent private values auction framework, I discuss the relationship
between the set of types and the distribution of types. I show that any set of types, ﬁnite
dimensional or not, can be extended to a larger set of types preserving incentive compat-
ibility constraints, expected revenue and bidder’s expected utilities. Thus for example we
may convexify a set of types making our model amenable to the large body of theory in
economics and mathematics that relies on convexity assumptions. An interesting applica-
tion of this extension procedure is to show that although revenue equivalence is not valid in
general if the set of types is not convex these mechanism have underlying distinct allocation
mechanism in the extension. Thus we recover in these situations the revenue equivalence.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D44
Keywords: optimal auction, independent private values, revenue equivalence, mechanism
design
1 Introduction
In this paper I study the relationship between types and distributions in an indepen-
dent private values auction framework. The simplest assumption we can make on
thesetofpossibletypes1 ofaneconomicagent2 isthatitisaﬁnitesetT.Thishow-
ever soon becomes unsatisfactory. Auction equilibria are in mixed strategies. We
cannot use calculus, most distributions requires a continuum of types to exist and
so on. The second simplest assumption we can make is that T is a non-degenerated
interval [a;b] ￿ R. Beyond this we may have multi-dimensional types T = [a;b]l
or more complicated sets. I now focus on an independent private values auction
? Monteiro acknowledges the ﬁnancial support of Edital Universal 02/06, CNPq.
1 Or valuations, signals.
2 I have in mind mainly a bidder in an auction setting.
7 March 2007model with I bidders. Thus suppose Ti, the set of types of Bidder i = 1;:::;I, is
given or appear endogenously in our model. Can we say something about the opti-
mal auction? Can we talk about revenue equivalence if Ti is not convex? I will show
that if we have M =(q;P) a voluntary participation, incentive compatible mecha-
nism deﬁned on T := ΠI
i=1Ti we can extend this mechanism, preserving voluntary
participation and incentive compatibility constraints to a mechanism ˜ M deﬁned on
˜ T := ΠI






Suppose Ti ￿ R is closed but is not an interval. How can we extend Ti to ˜ Ti =
conTi =[minTi;supTi]?Skreta(2006)presentamethodtoextendanoptimalmech-
anism (q;P) deﬁned on T to ˜ T. To understand his extension note ﬁrst that ˜ Ti nTi
is a countable union of disjoint intervals Il = (al;bl). That is ˜ TinTi = [∞
l=1Il. The
extended mechanism is constant in Il. This method works if we are looking for the
optimal mechanism. In this case as Skreta shows a bidder with type al < s < bl
chooses as type al. This method will not work if: (1) we allow for non-closed sets
of types3 ; (2) we want to extend mechanisms that are not optimal (like a ﬁrst-price
auction mechanism without a reserve price); (3) we have a higher dimensionality
set of types. The extension procedure I will introduce allows for abstract set of
types and any incentive compatible mechanism.
Once the extension procedure is accomplished we have very nice consequences.
First we may search for the optimal auction in a classical setup. Thus suppose the
set of types x 2 Ti has a distribution Fi and this distribution has a density fi : Ti !
(0;∞).ExtendingTi to ˜ Ti =conTi westillhaveadensity ˜ fi; ˜ Ti ![0;∞) but ˜ fi(x)=0
in ˜ Ti nTi. Thus we would like to apply Myerson’s (1981) characterization of the
optimal auction. This is however not possible since a key hypothesis of Myerson
(1981) is the strict positivity of the density on ˜ Ti. We may however apply Monteiro
and Svaiter (2007) which characterizes the optimal auction for any distribution. A
second consequence of the extension is that we recover revenue equivalence. For
exampleifweinitiallyhaveatwotypessetTi =fa;bg andtwobidders.Theoptimal
auction and the second price auction have the same allocation rule q but do not have
the same payment rule P. However if we extend the set of types to ˜ Ti =[a;b] we see
that the second-price auction and the optimal auction have distinct allocation rules
which implies distinct payment rules.
A third consequence of the extension procedure is to make it clear that what mat-
ters is the distribution of types. The extension procedure adds a probability zero
set of types. It makes it harder to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. But
those additional types should not matter. They do not change expected utilities nor
expected revenue.
3 Like [0;1]nQ.
22 Review of the auction model
I ﬁrst review the auction model with an abstract set of types. Let (Ωi;Bi) be a
measurable space. Deﬁne Ai = fB\Si;B 2 Big and let (Si;Ai;µi) be a probability
space, i = 1;:::;I. We extend µi to Bi in a natural way: µi(B) = µi(B\Si). Thus
µi(Sc
i) = 0. The valuation of Bidder i with type s 2 Si is given by Ui(s) where
Ui : Ωi ! R is a measurable function. Let Fi : R ! [0;1] be the distribution of Ui.
Thus Fi(x) = µi
￿￿
z 2 Si;Ui(z) ￿ x
￿￿
. Let S := ΠI
i=1Si and µ = µ1￿:::￿µI be the
product probability. Thus the joint distribution is F(s) = ΠI
i=1Fi(si).
An object is to be sold at an auction with I bidders. Each bidder knows his valuation
si 2 Si. A direct mechanism is (q;P) such that:











The auction proceeds as follows:
(i) Each bidder i = 1;:::;I announces privately and conﬁdentially si 2 Si to the
seller. Let s = (s1;s2;:::;sI);
(ii) Bidder i = 1;:::;I pays Pi(s);




Pi(s)dµ￿i(s￿i) and Qi(si) :=
Z
qi(s)dµ￿i(s￿i):
The direct mechanism (q;P) has to satisfy incentive compatibility (IC) and volun-


















Finally the seller’s expected revenue is
R
∑iPi(s)dµ(s). I ﬁnish this section with a
lemma that will be used in the next section.
Lemma 1 The expected payment Pi(￿) is bounded from below.
Proof: Fix a 2 Si. The incentive compatibility constraint implies that for every s 2
Si,Ui(a)Qi(a)￿Pi(a) ￿Ui(a)Qi(s)￿Pi(s). Thus Pi(s) ￿ ￿jUi(a)j+Pi(a) ending
the proof.
32.1 The extension procedure
Suppose (q;P) is voluntary participation incentive compatible mechanism on S. We
want to extend (q;P) to an voluntary participation incentive compatible mechanism
on Ω = Ω1￿:::￿ΩI. Let Xi = f(Qi(u);Pi(u));u 2 Sig and Ai := Xi[f(0;0)g. De-
ﬁne Ti : Si ! R the surplus: Ti(s) =Ui(s)Qi(s)￿Pi(s). I begin with the following
lemma.
Lemma 2 There exists a convex function φi : R ! R+ such that φi￿Ui = Ti. And









Lemma 1 implies that φi(z) is ﬁnite. And (0;0) 2 Ai implies φi(z) ￿ 0. Since φi is
a supremum of linear functions, z ! z￿Q￿P it is a convex function. Fix s 2 Si and
z0 := Ui(s). The incentive compatibility constraints imply that z0Qi(s)￿Pi(s) ￿





Note also that for every s 2 Si we have that
φi(z)￿φi(Ui(s)) ￿ z￿Qi(s)￿Pi(s)￿(Ui(s)Qi(s)￿Pi(s)) = (z￿Ui(s))Qi(s):










Qi(ω) if ω 2 Si;
(φi)0
+(Ui(ω)) if ω 2 ΩinSi.
(1)
¯ Pi(ω) = ￿φi(Ui(ω))+Ui(ω)Qi(ω);ω 2 Ωi: (2)
I now deﬁne the probabilities q = (q1;:::;qI) for ω 2 Ω. Let fe1;e2;:::;eIg be
the canonical basis of RI. Thus e1 = (1;0;:::;0) and so on. For every ω 2 Ω let
I(ω) = f1 ￿ j ￿ I;ωj 62 Sjg.
q(s) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
q(ω) if I(ω) = / 0;
0 if #I(ω) > 1;
Qi(ωi)ei if I(ω) = fig;i = 1;:::I:
Thus the seller keeps the object if at least two bidders announces ωj 62 Sj. If only
Bidder i announces ωi = 2 Si then ¯ qj(ω) = 0 for every j 6= i. And qi(ω) = Qi(ωi).
4Lemma 3 It is true that
R
Ω￿iqi(x;y)dµ￿i(y) = Qi(x).
Proof: Let l :=
R
Ω￿iqi(x;y)dµ￿i(y). First note that the integral over Ω￿i nS￿i is
null. If x2Si then qi(x;y)= qi(x;y) for every y2S￿i and l =
R
Ω￿iqi(x;y)dµ￿i(y)=
Qi(x) = Qi(x). If x 62 Si then qi(x;y) = Qi(x) for every y 2 S￿i and l = Qi(x) since
µ￿i(S￿i) = 1. QED




satisﬁes voluntary participation and
incentive compatibility constraints. It gives the same expected utility for Bidder i if
his type belongs to Si and gives the same revenue for the seller.
Proof: Let Ti(ω)=Ui(ω)Qi(ω)￿Pi(ω) be type ω2Ωi surplus. Suppose ω0 2Ωi.
From deﬁnition (2) we get Ti(ω) = φi(Ui(ω)). Therefore Ti(ω) ￿ 0 and voluntary



























Remark 1 It is clear from the construction that if S0
i is another set of types such
that the distribution Fi is the same then Bidder’s expected utilities is the same and
seller’s revenue also is the same.
I now show how to make this extension in a simple example.
Example 1 Let Si =fa;bg, i=1;2 where 0￿a<b. Suppose that Pr(a)= Pr(b)=
1
2. Consider a second-price auction. That is q1(a;a) = 1
2 = q1(b;b) and q1(a;b) =
0, q1(b;a) = 1. The payment is P1(s1;s2) = minfs1;s2g. The expected payment of
a type a bidder is P1(a) = P2(a) = a
4. The expected payment of type b bidders
P1(b) = P2(b) = 2a+b
4 : The revenue is R = 3a+b
4 . Let us extend the set of types










> > > <
> > > :
0 if z ￿ a;
z￿a







> > > <
> > > :
0 if z ￿ a;
1





In the optimal auction the allocation q is the same as in the second price auction.
However payment is different. The expected payment of type a is P1(a) = a
4: The
expected payment of tybe b is P1(b) = 2b+a
4 . Revenue is b+a
2 . The probability of
5winning the object now is
Q1(z) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if z < a;
1





3 Implications of the extension procedure for revenue equivalence
In example 1 above we saw that distinct payment rules are possible for the same
allocation rules if the set of types is not convex. I will show that if we enlarge the
set of types (preserving the distribution as before) we may deﬁne an allocation rule
which gives the right payoff. Thus by enlarging the set of types we may recover
the revenue equivalence theorem. That is, the allocation rule for bidders that are
“virtual” matters.
Theorem 2 SupposeUi(Ωi) ￿ conUi(Si). Then the payment Pi is a function of Qi.
Proof: Let S =ffxg;x 2 Rg be the set of singletons of real numbers. Let e :S !R
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